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ROBOTIC COLLECTIVE MEMORY 
MICHAL SHUR-OFRY* & GUY PESSACH** 
ABSTRACT 
The various ways in which robots and AI will affect our future society 
are at the center of scholarly attention. This Commentary, conversely, 
concentrates on their possible impact on humanity’s past, or more 
accurately, on the ways societies will remember their joint past. We focus 
on the emerging use of technologies that combine AI, cutting-edge 
visualization techniques, and social robots, in order to store and 
communicate recollections of the past in an interactive human-like manner. 
We explore the use of these technologies by remembrance institutions and 
their potential impact on collective memory. Taking a close look at the case 
study of NDT (New Dimensions in Testimony)—a project that uses ‘virtual 
witnesses’ to convey memories from the Holocaust and other mass 
atrocities—we highlight the significant value, and the potential 
vulnerabilities, of this new mode of memory construction.  
Against this background, we propose a novel concept of memory 
fiduciaries that can form the basis for a policy framework for robotic 
collective memory. Drawing on Jack Balkin’s concept of ‘information 
fiduciaries’ on the one hand, and on studies of collective memory on the 
other, we explain the nature of and the justifications for memory fiduciaries. 
We then demonstrate, in broad strokes, the potential implications of this 
new conceptualization for various questions pertaining to collective 
memory constructed by AI and robots. By so doing, this Commentary aims 
to start a conversation on the policies that would allow algorithmic 
collective memory to fulfill its potential, while minimizing its social costs. 
On a more general level, it brings to the fore a series of important policy 
questions pertaining to the intersection of new technologies and 
intergenerational collective memory.  
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INTRODUCTION, OR: MEET PINCHAS GUTTER 
Pinchas Gutter, a Holocaust survivor, is sitting in a room full of students. 
“My name is Pinchas Gutter,” he begins, “I will answer any questions you 
might have for me.” A boy raises his hand. “How old were you when the 
War ended?”, he asks. “I was between the ages thirteen and fourteen when 
the War ended. In 1945,” Gutter answers. A girl asks: “Do you remember 
any songs from your youth?” Gutter smiles. “This is a lullaby that my 
mother used to sing to me, and I still remember it. It’s in Polish.” Still 
smiling, he starts singing. His audience is fascinated, only the real Pinchas 
Gutter is not in the room. The conversation takes place with a virtual 
Pinchas Gutter—a hologram-like image, backed by sophisticated software.1 
The system integrates advanced display technologies, complicated natural 
language processing AI, and a database of pre-recorded video interviews 
conducted with Gutter himself.2 Their combination allows the ‘virtual 
Gutter’ to identify the audience’s questions, match the most relevant 
response from the pre-existing database, and present the answer, as 
originally delivered by Gutter, in what simulates a human conversational 
interaction.3  
 
1. A video of the above-quoted discussion is available on YouTube. ICT Vision & Graphics 
Lab, New Dimensions in Testimony - USC ICT and SFI - Classroom Concept, YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AnF630tCiEk. 
2. A description of the technology can be found on the project’s website, Dimensions in 
Testimony, USC SHOAH FOUND., https://sfi.usc.edu/collections/holocaust/ndt [https://perma.cc/D526-S 
VP9], and in Part II infra. 














Figure 1: The Virtual Pinchas Gutter in a Classroom4 
The virtual Gutter is part of New Dimensions in Testimony (NDT)—a 
pioneering project of the USC Shoah Foundation that enables people to have 
conversations with pre-recorded videos of Holocaust survivors and other 
witnesses to genocide.5 In a sense, these virtual witnesses are part of a 
growing phenomenon of AI-based social robots—robots that are engineered 
to engage with humans in a social-like manner, exercising learning, 
communication, and adaptive software capabilities.6 With the development 
of machine learning and visualization techniques, the use of AI and social 
robots is expanding, and their impact on future human lives has become the 
subject of intense law and policy discussion.7 
Yet, what is largely missing from this conversation, and what is striking 
in the case of the virtual Pinchas Gutter, is the use of AI and social robots 
in a way that affects humanity’s past, or more accurately our collective 
memory of the past. This Commentary uses the NDT project as a starting 
 
4. See ICT Vision & Graphics Lab, supra note 1. 
5. Id. 
6. In this Commentary, we use the term “robots” in a rather elaborated way, to include not only 
robots embodied in a material object, but also other AI and machine learning agents that interact with 
their ‘end-users.’ We also use the terms “robotic,” “virtual,” and “algorithmic” memory agents 
interchangeably. While certain distinctions exist, they are immaterial for the purpose of the present 
discussion. See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. For the development of the social robots 
concept, see Cynthia Breazeal, Towards Sociable Robots, 42 ROBOTICS & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 167, 
174 (2003) (discussing categories of social robots and arguing that “endowing a robot with social skills 
and capabilities has benefits far beyond the interface value for the person who interacts with it”). For 
examples of various social robots and a discussion of their prominent attributes, see infra Part II.  
7. See Frank Pasquale & Arthur J. Cockfield, Beyond Instrumentalism: A Substantivist 
Perspective on Law, Technology, and the Digital Persona, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 821, 842–44 
(referring to a long line of works that identify how AI and digital technology transform “human 
experience, identity, and aims”). For discussions of the impact of social robots, see, for example, Kate 
Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and 
Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW 213 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & 
Ian Kerr eds., 2016) [hereinafter Darling, Social Robots]; Kate Darling, “Who's Johnny?” 
Anthropomorphic Framing in Human-Robot Interaction, Integration, and Policy, in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: 
FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 173 (Patrick Lin, Ryan Jenkins & Keith 
Abney eds., 2017) [hereinafter Darling, Johnny] (describing the phenomenon of social robots and 
discussing related ethical aspects); infra notes 53–60.  











point for a broader discussion of the policy questions pertaining to the 
interface of AI, collective memory, and the law. How will societies 
remember the joint past in an era of virtual memory agents? Should the law 
regulate the use of AI and robots in ways that affect collective memory, and 
if so, what would be an appropriate policy framework? These questions are 
at the center of our inquiry. While our point of departure is the case study 
of NDT’s virtual witnesses, our analysis applies to a broader range of cases 
where collective memory is mediated through AI-based technologies that 
possess interactive-communicative skills and perceived human-like 
authenticity.8 
Part I of this Commentary begins with a brief introduction of collective 
memory, a concept that is the subject of burgeoning interdisciplinary 
literature, yet is still largely new to legal analysis. We briefly explain the 
notion of collective memory, its social value for the construction of 
collective and individual identities, and the multiple ways that affect its 
formation.  
Part II takes a closer look at the emerging use of robotic memory agents 
in the construction of collective memory. Relying on interdisciplinary 
studies, we show that this new medium carries great promise; it allows for 
interactions that feel natural, encourages trust and empathy, and can help 
bridge temporal gaps. It may also be particularly important for overcoming 
or mitigating ‘problems of representation’ that exist in cases of genocide or 
other extreme events.9 Following this discussion, we proceed to explore 
potential concerns entailed in this new medium of memory construction, 
identifying two primary challenges: First, the use of AI-based memory 
agents inevitably involves editorial choices that may not be transparent to 
their ‘end-users.’ While such choices are an unavoidable part of each 
medium that provides information, the traits of robotic memory agents 
might make these choices particularly invisible. Secondly, these ‘modes of 
memory’ are more susceptible to hacking, manipulation by third parties, and 
other vulnerabilities in comparison to more traditional media that affect 
memory construction. These concerns are particularly pronounced since this 
new medium, by its nature, evokes feelings of trust and reliance on part of 
its ‘users.’  
Against this backdrop, Part III of this Commentary explores the potential 
policy responses to these developments. Relying on socio-cultural studies 
of collective memory and building on the concept of ‘information 
 
8. As we explain in Parts II and III infra, our analysis also encompasses algorithmic memory 
agents that are based on verbal interactions without a visual interface. 












fiduciaries’ developed by Jack Balkin,10 we introduce a new concept of 
‘memory fiduciaries.’ We explain the nature of and the justifications for 
memory fiduciaries, and demonstrate, in broad strokes, the potential 
implications of this new conceptualization for various questions pertaining 
to collective memory constructed by robots. Our purpose is neither to 
exhaust the discussion, nor to present a comprehensive ‘menu’ of legal 
solutions. Rather we aim to start a policy discussion about the important 
questions that are at the interface of collective memory, new technologies, 
and the law. 
I. A BRIEF PRIMER TO COLLECTIVE MEMORY  
The notion of collective memory refers to the joint recollection of the 
past by societies, communities, nations, and additional groups with elements 
of a joint identity.11 Largely attributed to sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, 
the modern concept of collective memory relies on the understanding that 
memories are, to an extent, a product of social construction.12 In other 
words, our memories are not merely the sum of our own individual 
experiences, but are constructed in part by the groups to which we belong, 
be they nations, religious groups, minority groups, kinship networks, or 
other communities. To illustrate, many of us would say, in everyday 
parlance, that we remember the first human landing on the moon, the 
Kennedy assassination, or the Holocaust, although we did not personally 
experience these events and may not have even been born when they 
occurred.13 Thus, the focus of collective memory is not on the cognitive 
processes of individual memory formation and retrieval, but rather on the 
social processes and elements that shape our memories as groups.14  
During the past few decades, the study of collective memory has rapidly 
developed into a burgeoning, multi-disciplinary field, integrating insights 
from sociology, history, anthropology, communication studies, and 
 
10. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1183 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries]. 
11. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Olick & Joyce Robbins, Social Memory Studies: From "Collective 
Memory" to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 105, 106 (1998); 
Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi & Daniel Levy, Introduction to THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY 
READER 3, 16–22 (Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi & Daniel Levy eds., 2011); Jeffrey K. 
Olick, Collective Memory: The Two Cultures, 17 SOC. THEORY 333, 334–35 (1999).  
12. See MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY 37–40 (Lewis A. Coser ed. and 
trans., 1992). 
13. See, e.g., Eviatar Zerubavel, Social Memories: Steps to a Sociology of the Past, 19 
QUALITATIVE SOC. 283, 289–90 (1996) (explaining that people share the memories of the groups to 
which they belong, even when they did not individually experience them). 
14. See, e.g., Olick & Robbins, supra note 11, at 106–08 (discussing the development of the 
perception of collective memory as a social construction of the past).  











additional areas.15 This scholarship recognizes that collective memory 
forms the connection between groups and their past.16 It is thus necessary 
for narrating the life-stories of nations and communities, and constitutes a 
vital part of their collective identities.17 Moreover, when the relevant groups 
are minorities or groups that were exposed to atrocities and persecution, 
collective memory is perceived as a means of empowerment and 
restoration.18 Studies further instruct that collective memory is important for 
the formation of individual identity as well, since the social and cultural 
groups of which we are a part deeply influence our sense of self and 
identity.19  
Although often relying on historical accounts, collective memory is not 
synonymous with history. Since it is a product of social construct, it has 
subjective and normative dimensions, and can more easily encompass a 
multiplicity of voices and meanings.20 Indeed, the same historical event—
for example, the atomic bomb on Hiroshima—can play an entirely different 
role in the collective memory of different groups.21  
 
15. See, e.g., Olick & Robbins, supra note 11, at 106.  
16. See, e.g., Amos Funkenstein, Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness, 1 HIST. & 
MEMORY 5, 5 (1989) (“[W]ithout memory of the past there is no history, in the sense of the events that 
are meaningful to the collective, events experienced by a collective that is aware of them.”). 
17. See, e.g., Olick, supra note 11, at 333 (“Collective memory . . . often plays an important role 
in politics and society.”); Zerubavel, supra note 13, at 290 (“[B]eing social presupposes the ability to 
experience events that had happened to groups and communities to which we belong long before we 
joined them as if they were part of our own past . . . ."); Barbie Zelizer, Reading the Past Against the 
Grain: The Shape of Memory Studies, 12 CRITICAL STUD. MASS COMM. 214, 226–28 (1995); Jan 
Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity, 65 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 125, 126 (John 
Czaplicka trans., 1995); IWONA IRWIN-ZARECKA, FRAMES OF REMEMBRANCE: THE DYNAMICS OF 
COLLECTIVE MEMORY 47–57 (1994).  
18. See, e.g., Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social 
Justice, 47 UCLA. L. REV. 1747, 1758 (2000) ("Collective memory not only vivifies a group's past, it 
also reconstructs it and thereby situates a group in relation to others in a power hierarchy."); Sara Jones, 
“Simply a Little Piece of GDR History”?: The Role of Memorialization in Post-Socialist Transitional 
Justice in Germany, 27 HIST. & MEMORY 154 (2015) (considering the role that collective 
memorialization plays in transitional justice). 
19. See, e.g., Susan A. Crane, Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory, 102 AM. 
HIST. REV. 1372, 1381–83 (1997) (discussing the relations between individuals and collective memory); 
Assmann, supra note 17, at 127; W. James Booth, The Work of Memory: Time, Identity, and Justice, 75 
SOC. RES. 237 (2008) (discussing the value of collective memory for the formation of individual 
identity). 
20. See Olick & Robbins, supra note 11, at 110 (discussing the relations between social memory 
studies and historiography); Funkenstein, supra note 16, at 5 (referring to Hegel’s conception of history 
and to the distinction between memory and history); Steven Knapp, Collective Memory and the Actual 
Past, 26 REPRESENTATIONS 123, 141 (1989) (explaining that “shared values are likely to be connected 
to the narratives preserved by collective memories”). 
21. See, e.g., Stefanie Fishel, Remembering Nukes: Collective Memories and Countering State 
History, 1 CRITICAL MIL. STUD. 131, 136–37, 141 (2015) (comparing the different memorialization of 
the use of nuclear weapons in Japan and the United States, and describing how in Japan the bomb was 
commemorated as a sacrifice for peace, while in the United States, a Smithsonian exhibition that meant 
to convey a message that “a mission using nuclear weapons against human beings should not be 












Relatedly, multiple sources affect the formation of collective memory. A 
non-exhaustive list includes historical and documentary materials, formal 
and informal studies, media coverage, visits to physical sites, as well as 
community rituals and witness testimonies.22 From the perspective of 
collective memory construction, the latter are particularly important. The 
reason is that witnesses are able to convey stories and experiences in a 
direct, non-mediated way that “save[s] the imagination from abstraction.”23 
While people may perceive archival materials as reflections of distant 
events that are “in the past,” witness testimonies create an intimate effect 
that bridges this gap and allows the distance to disappear.24 This is 
particularly important for the collective memory of traumatic and radical 
events, such as genocide, where the extremity and magnitude of the event 
makes it particularly difficult to grasp by ordinary means of documentation 
and storytelling.25 To illustrate, Holocaust research indicates that the 
testimonies of thousands of Holocaust survivors, describing “the fate of one 
person and then another, of one family and then another,” helped transform 
the abstract concept of “six million” Jewish Holocaust victims into 
something more concrete and comprehensible.26 To use the words of 
director Claude Lanzmann, “There was an absolute break between the 
bookish knowledge I had acquired and what these people told me.”27 This 
understanding initiated the formation of archives comprised of large 
collections of witness testimonies, such as the Fortunoff archive at Yale 
 
22. See, e.g., Olick & Robbins, supra note 11, at 106–08 (describing various sources that play a 
role in social memory construction); HALBWACHS, supra note 12, at 52–53 (discussing the spatial 
aspects of collective memory); Geoffrey H. Hartman, Learning from Survivors: The Yale Testimony 
Project, 9 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 192 (1995) (analyzing the significance of witness 
testimonies). 
23. Hartman, supra note 22, at 192.  
24. Id. at 198.  
25. In the context of the Holocaust, this phenomenon is often referred to as “the problem of 
representation,” see Saul Friedlander, Introduction to PROBING THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION: 
NAZISM AND THE “FINAL SOLUTION" 1, 3 (Saul Friedlander ed., 1992); Geoffrey H. Hartman, 
Introduction: Darkness Visible, in HOLOCAUST REMEMBRANCE: THE SHAPES OF MEMORY 1, 2, 5–6 
(Geoffrey H. Hartman ed., 1994) (discussing the difficulties to represent the Holocaust by traditional 
means and modes of representation).  
26. Hartman, supra note 22, at 195 (referring to video testimonies of Holocaust survivors that 
comprise the Yale Testimony Project).  
27. Hartman, supra note 22, at 203 (quoting Claude Lanzmann, Le Lieu et la Parole, in AU SUJET 
DE SHOAH: LE FILM DE CLAUDE LANZMANN 293, 294 (Michel Deguy ed., 1990) (referring to the 
renowned film “Shoah”)). 











University,28 and the archive of the USC Shoah Foundation.29 The latter is 
also the source of the NDT technology to which we turn shortly. 
These collections highlight a more general point: witness testimonies, 
like other sources that comprise collective memory, are often collected and 
mediated to the public through ‘remembrance institutions’—entities such as 
archives, libraries, and museums, which select, document, preserve, and 
provide access to various materials and artifacts.30 Obviously, remembrance 
institutions are not the sole entities that mediate these materials and affect 
collective memory. Multiple other sources play a role in its construction, 
including social media, fiction films, documentaries, popular press, or 
education systems. Yet, the role of remembrance institutions is prominent, 
especially with respect to events that produce abundant piecemeal materials. 
Consider, for example, the American Civil War.31 Each piece alone is 
unlikely to have sufficient market demand, and therefore has no real 
prospects of being distributed through commercial market channels. Yet, 
the pieces’ collection together by a remembrance institution enables us to 
draw a ‘big picture’ that is greater than the sum of its components, and has 
a substantial impact on collective memory.32  
As the discussion below demonstrates, the role of these institutions is 
becoming all the more significant when artificial intelligence and robots are 
involved in the mediation of memories.33 The next Part thus returns to the 
virtual Gutter, and explores the potential effect of these technological 
developments on the formation of collective memory.  
 
28. The Fortunoff archive began as a grassroots enterprise in New Haven, and currently holds 
more than 4,400 testimonies comprising 12,000 recorded hours of videotape. See Fortunoff Video 
Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, YALE, https://fortunoff.library.yale.edu/ [https://perma.cc/DHG6-E 
799]. 
29. The USC Shoah Foundation’s Archive currently has more than 55,000 video testimonies. 
Most of those testimonies were given by Holocaust survivors, but the archive has expanded to include 
testimonies from other cases of genocide and mass atrocities, including the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, 
the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, the Armenian Genocide, and the Guatemalan Genocide. See About Us, USC 
SHOAH FOUND., https://sfi.usc.edu/about [https://perma.cc/RXX2-N43H].  
30. Guy Pessach, [Networked] Memory Institutions: Social Remembering, Privatization and Its 
Discontents, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 73 (2008); Guy Pessach & Michal Shur-Ofry, Copyright 
and the Holocaust, 30 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 121, 136–37, 158 (2018) (discussing the role of 
remembrance institutions with respect to the Holocaust’s collective memory).  
31. The abundant piecemeal materials from the Civil War include, among others, thousands of 
photos, war maps, cartoons, battle chronicles, newspaper articles, rosters of soldiers, and additional 
official documents. See, e.g., The Civil War in America, LIBR. CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/ 
civil-war-in-america/learn-more.html [https://perma.cc/39FT-JRSS]. 
32. Cf. Pessach & Shur-Ofry, supra note 30, at 168–69. 












II. COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN THE AGE OF AI 
A. Virtual Memory Agents and Social Robots 
The virtual Pinchas Gutter, along with additional ‘virtual witnesses’ that 
form part of the NDT project, reflect the recognition of the significance of 
witness testimonies, and the realization that at a certain point, live witnesses 
of the Holocaust and other genocides will no longer be available.34 The 
introduction of the technology seems to have been accompanied by a 
remarkable degree of reflection and self-awareness on part of the 
institutions involved, making NDT a particularly apt case study for our 
purposes.35 
According to information supplied by the NDT project, the interaction 
with each ‘virtual witness’ relies on a database of answers and recollections 
of the real survivors, who were filmed answering thousands of questions in 
a long and detailed interview process.36 The database connects with a 
natural language processing software with learning capabilities, which is 
able to “understand” the questions people ask the virtual witness. Based on 
the recognition of similarities between word patterns in the end-users’ 
questions and the answers given by the original survivor, the software 
selects the most relevant answer from the database.37 The data is then 
captured and played back verbatim, as delivered by the survivor.38 Thus, the 
technology enables the virtual witness to seamlessly answer the question 
posed, using the original answers of the actual survivor. 39  
 
34. See New Dimensions Body Text, supra note 3 (“Years from now, long after the last 
[Holocaust] survivor has left us, Dimensions in Testimony will be able to provide a valuable opportunity 
to engage with a survivor and ask them questions directly . . . .”).  
35. For example, the project was extensively discussed in a conference titled “Digital 
Approaches to Genocide Studies” held by the USC Shoah Foundation in 2017. See Institute News: 
Scholars Consider Ethics, Possibilities, and Critiques of New Dimensions in Testimony at Digital 
Approaches to Genocide Studies Conference, USC SHOAH FOUND. (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://sfi.usc.edu/news/2017/11/20081-scholars-consider-ethics-possibilities-and-critiques-new-dimen 
sions-testimony [https://perma.cc/XAP9-J7ZR] [hereinafter Scholars Consider].  
36. Technology in Service to Humanity, USC SHOAH FOUND. (Nov. 2017), https://sfi.usc.edu/site 
s/default/files/.../dit_one_sheet_holocaust_20181019_opt.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K8U-54WM] 
(“During the interview process, the survivor sits in the middle of a light stage beneath a half dome 
latticed with lights and more than 100 video cameras. Each subject answers as many as 2,000 questions 
that cover a vast range of subjects.”). 
37. New Dimensions in Testimony, USC SHOAH FOUND. (Apr. 2017), https://www.ilholocaustmu 
seum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/New-Dimensions-in-Testimony-one-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/Q8ZP-ZQP8] (describing the operation of the natural language processing software). 
38. Technology in Service to Humanity, supra note 36 (“Using natural-language technology, the 
program matches questions with the survivor’s most relevant response.”); New Dimensions in 
Testimony, supra note 37 (“Whether people ask, “Where were you born?”, “Do you believe in God?”, 
“How did you survive?”, data is captured and processed into video segments that can be played back 
verbatim, precisely as the survivors delivered them.”). 
39.  See Technology in Service to Humanity, supra note 36; New Dimensions in Testimony, USC 
INST. FOR CREATIVE TECHS., http://ict.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/overviews/New%20Dimensions%2 











The sophisticated visualization of the virtual witness, although not 
strictly a hologram, further amplifies the interactive, natural conversation 
experience.40 Future development of the technology will further enhance 
this feeling of natural interaction. For example, over time the algorithms 
underlying the virtual witnesses will learn to respond to vocal cues 
signifying age, and select the answers accordingly.41 Likewise, advances in 
visualization techniques will allow the display of the witnesses in three, 
rather than two, dimensions.42  
Virtual witnesses are certainly a disruptive technology in the field of 
collective memory. Yet, this development should not be viewed in isolation. 
In order to normatively evaluate it, one should locate it against a broader 
field of technologies that aim to create a natural interaction experience 
between humans and algorithms. To use some famous examples, the newly 
introduced Google Duplex technology can conduct natural conversations in 
order to carry out specific tasks, such as scheduling appointments over the 
phone.43 By mimicking ordinary interaction, including the incorporation of 
speech disfluencies—“hmm”s and “uh”s—the system allows people to 
speak normally, without having to adapt to a machine.44 Likewise, the USC 
Institute for Creative Technologies, which created the technologies 
underlying the NDT project, developed a number of virtual human 
characters with similar capabilities, for purposes such as training 
psychologists, treating soldiers who underwent traumatic experiences, or 
sparking interest in science and technology among young people.45  
These technologies are paralleled by significant developments in the 
fields of visualization and imaging. To illustrate, scientists have recently 
created a photorealistic ‘talking head’ model of Barack Obama—an AI-
based virtual video of Obama, who moves his (virtual) lips in 
synchronization with speech implanted by the researchers in a seemingly 
 
0in%20Testimony_Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP66-PFRR]; Eillie Anzilotti, So We Never Forget, 
Holograms Will Keep Delivering First-Person Holocaust Survivor Testimony, FAST COMPANY (June 
20, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40427922/so-we-never-forget-holograms-will-keep-deliverin 
g-first-person-holocaust-survivor-testimony [https://perma.cc/S42C-U7GH].  
40. Technology in Service to Humanity, supra note 36; Anzilotti, supra note 39; New Dimensions 
in Testimony, supra note 37. 
41. Anzilotti, supra note 39 (quoting one of the project’s leaders). 
42. New Dimensions in Testimony, supra note 37 (“Soon, visualization techniques in 
development will be able to display the survivor in three dimensions—no 3-D glasses required—to 
provide an experience as close as possible to face-to-face interaction.”). 
43. Yaniv Leviathan & Yossi Matias, Google Duplex: An AI System for Accomplishing Real-
World Tasks Over the Phone, GOOGLE AI BLOG (May 8, 2018), https://ai.googleblog.com/2018/05/dupl 
ex-ai-system-for-natural-conversation.html [https://perma.cc/N8SM-BRX2]. 
44. Id. 













natural way.46 Further, the current state of three-dimensional holograms 
allows virtual participation in meetings and conferences, while bridging 
geographical distance and creating a more personal communication 
experience.47  
More generally, these technologies can be viewed as part of the 
expanding use of social robots, namely AI that is engineered to engage with 
humans in a social-like manner, demonstrating adaptability, learning, and 
communication capabilities.48 Examples include interactive toys, such as 
robotic dogs, dolls, and dinosaurs,49 robots that function as personal 
assistants, and robotic companions that serve medical and social purposes.50 
Indeed, the virtual witnesses we focus on might not strictly qualify as 
‘robots,’ since they may lack a physical embodiment.51 Nevertheless, much 
like physical social robots, their essence lies in their ability to interact with 
humans in a sociable manner.52 Therefore, viewing virtual memory agents 
through the prism of social robots allows us to better assess the benefits and 
challenges entailed in their use in contexts that affect collective memory. 
We turn to this analysis in the following section.  
 
46. Supasorn Suwajanakorn, Steven M. Seitz & Ira Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, Synthesizing 
Obama: Learning Lip Sync from Audio, 36 TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS 95 (2017). 
47. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gibney, Physicists Create Star Wars-Style 3D Projections — Just Don’t 
Call Them Holograms, NATURE (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-01125-y 
[https://perma.cc/RU8T-WZAK]; Jena McGregor, ‘Star Wars’ Meets the C-suite: This CEO’s 
Hologram Is Beaming into Meetings, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2016, 6:08 AM), https://www.washingtonp 
ost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/04/13/star-wars-meets-the-c-suite-why-this-ceos-hologram-is-ge 
tting-beamed-into-meetings/?noredirect=on (detailing the use of holograms in multi-national 
corporations and quoting Accenture’s CEO: “I believe my hologram might be as good as me”). 
48.  See Breazeal, supra note 6, at 167; Darling, Social Robots, supra note 7, at 213; Ari Ezra 
Waldman, Safe Social Spaces, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1537, 1560–62 (2019) (explaining that social robots 
display “social abilities, including communication, cooperation, and learning” and further discussing the 
entailed risks to privacy). 
49. See sources cited supra note 48; see also Eldar Haber, Toying with Privacy: Regulating the 
Internet of Toys, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 401 (2019). 
50. Darling, Social Robots, supra note 7, at 213.  
51. See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 532 (2015) 
(listing physical embodiment as one of the attributes of social robots); Waldman, supra note 48, at 1561 
(discussing the physical dimension of social robots). But cf. Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How 
Should the Law Think About Robots?, in ROBOT LAW, supra note 7, at 3, 5–6 (discussing the ambiguity 
in the definition of a robot); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, You Might Be a Robot, CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327602 (discussing the problems of defining robots and 
arguing that such ex ante definition may be impossible).   
52. Therefore, as explained in the Introduction, in this Commentary we use the term “robots” in 
an elaborated way that is not restricted to physical robots. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of 
Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2017) [hereinafter Balkin, Three Laws] 
(“When I talk of robots, however, I will include not only robots—embodied material objects that interact 
with their environment—but also artificial intelligence agents and machine learning algorithms.”).  











B. Benefits and Challenges 
One prominent attribute of social robots is the response they evoke from 
humans. Research indicates that robots’ interactive behavior and ability to 
communicate and cooperate with people trigger anthropomorphism—a 
tendency to ascribe human qualities to the AI.53 In other words, the verbal 
skills, the adaptability, and the seemingly-autonomous actions distinguish 
these systems in the human mind from mere machines, and make us react 
to them as if they were humans.54 This tendency is intensified when the 
system appears human and animated, and uses facial expressions that we 
recognize and intuitively relate to, as is the case in the NDT project.55 
Interestingly, the effect subsists even when people are aware that they are 
interacting with a robot, and does not seem to disappear even for 
sophisticated users who are fully informed about the technology underlying 
the system.56  
These traits shed light on the benefits of using robotic memory agents by 
remembrance institutions. As the case of Pinchas Gutter demonstrates, 
virtual witnesses can indeed connect with people in a way that elicits 
empathy and trust. The ability to interact, receive a response, form eye 
contact with the virtual witness, and follow his body language allows the 
users to form personal, intimate connection that is not possible when 
exposed to written or even video-taped testimonies.57 While not equivalent 
to speaking to a natural person, this interactive mode of testimony creates 
an almost-natural conversation feeling.58 As technology evolves, the sense 
 
53. See Breazeal, supra note 6, at 168 (explaining that combining the robot’s learning ability, 
creature-like behavior, and its “ability to communicate with, cooperate with, and learn from people 
makes it almost impossible for one to not anthropomorphize [it] (i.e., attribute human or animal-like 
qualities)”).  
54. Id.; Darling, Social Robots, supra note 7, at 218 (“[Social robots] elicit emotional reactions 
from people that are similar . . . to how we react to animals and to each other.”). 
55. Darling, Social Robots, supra note 7, at 218–19 (discussing the robot’s animated look as a 
factor that affects anthropomorphism).  
56. Matthias Scheutz, The Inherent Dangers of Unidirectional Emotional Bonds Between 
Humans and Social Robots, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 
205, 213–14 (Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & George A. Bekey eds., 2012) (describing this effect among 
roboticists from the MIT Media Lab); Darling, Johnny, supra note 7, at 173 (“Research shows that 
humans tend to anthropomorphize robotic technology, treating it as though it were alive, even if we know 
better.” (emphasis added)). 
57. See Scholars Consider, supra note 35 (quoting researcher Noah Shenker: “There was 
something incredibly ritualistic and quite moving about the encounters between the users of the 
testimony and Pinchas . . . . The nodding of the head as he listened, the eye contact that was maintained 
between most of the users and Pinchas . . . .”). 
58. See, e.g., Christina Newland, These VR Films Let Viewers Talk to Refugees and Holocaust 
Survivors, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (June 17, 2016, 12:40 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kb733 
e/vr-sheffield-doc-fest-talk-to-refugees-and-holocaust-survivors [https://perma.cc/GL65-LGXH] 
(“[The virtual Gutter] maintains eye contact and gives a real sense of naturalism, offering the spectator 












of natural interaction will likely increase and further enhance the 
effectiveness of the testimony. Thus, virtual witnesses enable remembrance 
institutions to narrow the gap previously described between events that are 
‘in the past’ and events that are socially relevant to our lives today.59 
Moreover, in the case of radical events, these technologies can significantly 
contribute to reducing problems of representation, making the abstract more 
concrete and perhaps a little more comprehensible.60  
Alongside these significant virtues, there are, of course, challenges. 
Literature exploring the utilization of AI and social robots in various 
contemporary contexts often concentrates on the threats these technologies 
pose to their users’ privacy.61 Yet, in the context of collective memory 
construction, we believe the focal point of the discussion should be 
different.  
A major challenge in our case lies in the fact that algorithmic memory 
agents are not neutral representations of past events, or even of witnesses’ 
memories of those events. Rather, they inevitably involve, and reflect, a set 
of the editorial choices made by their creators. The NDT project, for 
example, is fraught with such decisions. Examples include selecting the live 
witnesses participating in the project; determining the location, length, and 
angles of filming; choosing the number, order, and nature of questions 
directed at the witnesses, as well as training the natural language processing 
AI that intermediates between the databases’ contents and the users of the 
testimonies. Each such decision may influence the interactions between the 
users and the virtual witness, and as a result, bears significance for the 
construction of collective memory.62  
 
Leopard: “Pinchas is a much more visual representation of a human, but there are stoppages, . . . . The 
consciousness is still in the realm of the uncanny”). 
59. Anzilotti, supra note 39 (quoting one of the NDT project’s leaders: “We find that when a 
survivor speaks to a classroom or in the public domain, that impact that the meet-and-greet, the questions 
and answers, has on people and how we understand that history is significant”); cf. Noah Shenker, 
Through the Lens of the Shoah: The Holocaust as a Paradigm for Documenting Genocide Testimonies, 
28 HIST. & MEMORY 141, 141–42 (2016) (describing the struggle of archives and museums to “preserve 
and circulate survivor testimonies of the Holocaust for future generations in ways that are socially 
relevant to those who will have had no exposure to living witnesses”). 
60. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
61. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and 
Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809 (2010) (exploring the implications of technologies 
that imitate people for traditional privacy values); Waldman, supra note 48 (describing the potential 
hazards of technologies that mediate social interaction for users’ privacy and safety); Haber, supra note 
49 (discussing privacy concerns related to interactive toys). 
62. Cf. Michal Shur-Ofry, Databases and Dynamism, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 315, 325–28 
(2011) (observing, with respect to databases: “By determining the scope of information included in the 
database and the manner in which that information is accessed and retrieved, selections and 
arrangements contextualize database content and influence the manner in which that content is 
understood and interpreted by users”). 











Notably, the NDT case study is not an extreme example from the 
perspective of editorial discretion. According to the information they 
released, the project’s creators seem to have taken considerable effort to 
minimize the inevitable gap between the original testimonies and the virtual 
witnesses, through a variety of means, including the use of the witnesses’ 
original answers as output.63 Nevertheless, some discrepancies inevitably 
remain. Thus, research indicates that the new medium of virtual witnesses 
yields testimony that is “led by the users,” namely comprised of answers to 
users’ questions, in comparison to testimonies of actual witnesses telling 
their stories, which are much more driven by the witnesses themselves.64  
In addition, one can easily envisage other uses of AI for collective 
memory construction that would result in a greater discrepancy between the 
underlying materials and the AI output. Imagine, for example, an AI that 
integrates a large collection of testimonies from the Vietnam War, thus 
creating the ‘ultimate witness’—one that delivers an integrated testimony 
about the War—or a ‘virtual Abraham Lincoln’—one that relies on the 
40,550 ‘Lincoln papers’ stored at the Library of Congress to answer 
people’s questions.65 One can also imagine less benign cases, where 
interested parties may use this new technology to advance ‘alternative’ or 
biased narratives, while concealing their editorial discretion.  
Importantly, editorial decisions that result in a gap between the raw 
information and its representation are not confined to AI or even to digital 
technology. Every medium that conveys information necessarily involves 
the judgment of its creators regarding the meaning and importance of that 
information.66 Archives, databases, exhibitions, video collections, and other 
modes of memory construction always entail selection, discretion, and 
 
63. See the technology description, supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text.  
64. See Scholars Consider, supra note 35 (quoting Noah Shenker: “The experience . . . now 
focused on the user—the agency of the survivor was moved to user-driven imperatives. . . . Pinchas no 
longer speaks to listeners from start to finish, but we must ask questions to trigger sporadic narratives”); 
Noah Shenker & Dan Leopard, Presentation at the Memory Studies Association Conference: Pinchas 
Gutter: The Virtual Holocaust Survivor as Embodied Archive (Dec. 2017) (referring to the virtual 
testimony as “testimony on demand”).  
65. For information about the Lincoln Papers Collection, see Abraham Lincoln Papers at the 
Library of Congress, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/collections/abraham-lincoln-papers/abo 
ut-this-collection/ [https://perma.cc/8R2G-ADVC]. While the example is hypothetical, technologies that 
attempt to construct a virtual Lincoln have existed since 1964, when Disney introduced its “Audio-
Animatronics” version of Lincoln at the New York World's Fair. See The Disneyland Story Presenting 
Great Moments with Mr. Lincoln, DISNEYLAND, https://disneyland.disney.go.com/attractions/disneylan 
d/disneyland-story?int_cmp=SOC-intDPFY11Q3NewTechBornAtDLR21-04-11@0004 [https://perma 
.cc/E3SV-X87Y] (mentioning that the version “was so life-like that National Geographic magazine 
called the figure ‘alarming’ in its realism”). For a current, more advanced version of the animated 
Lincoln, see Bus. Insider, This Abraham Lincoln Animatronic Is So Life-Like You'll Feel like You're in 
1863, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f6hEgDDRYds.  
66.  Cf. Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright 












prioritization.67 These choices make them sites of meaning-making, which 
impact collective memory. To use the words of Schwartz and Cook, 
“Through archives, the past is controlled.”68  
Often, these editorial choices are not easily transparent to the users 
exposed to the materials.69 Yet, with respect to collective memory 
construction through algorithmic-based, seemingly human agents, this layer 
of editorial choices becomes even more invisible, due to the specific traits 
of the technology: the (almost) natural interaction, and the personal, 
intimate feelings that the medium evokes. In other words, the human 
tendency to anthropomorphize and attribute human qualities to social robots 
may further decrease our ability to discern between the real, and the virtual 
representation that is mediated through a series of human decisions.  
A second prominent challenge that presents itself in the use of virtual 
memory agents and other AI-based technologies is their susceptibility to 
hacking, manipulation by third parties, or technical failures that may harm 
the authenticity of the mediated content. Obviously, similar vulnerabilities 
exist in any other field using AI and robots. Famous examples include 
Amazon’s ‘Alexa’ proposing porn content to a toddler,70 or reports about 
Microsoft’s decision to suspend ‘Tay,’ its AI chatterbot, from tweeting, in 
light of its racist outbursts.71 Moreover, the fear of manipulation subsists, to 
a certain extent, with respect to more traditional modes of memory 
mediation as well: documents can be forged, videos may be corrupted, and 
artifacts may be damaged. Yet, here, too, due to the traits of the medium, 
the concern becomes more pronounced, and the effect of misuse may be 
greater. Put differently, if our past is controlled through the archive,72 our 
 
67. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 22, at 201–02 (referring to the Yale testimony project and 
observing: “If we had stopped to resolve all the questions surrounding our effort—including that of the 
exact value of oral history as history—we would never have proceeded beyond the first experimental 
tapes. . . . We do not deceive ourselves into thinking that we have developed the perfect interview. There 
may be no such thing: the quality of oral history is influenced by the human chemistry between 
interviewer and interviewee, and even by the day and place of filming”). 
68. Joan M. Schwartz & Terry Cook, Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of Modern 
Memory, 2 ARCHIVAL SCI. 1, 1 (2002).  
69. Cf. Shur-Ofry, supra note 62, at 322 (observing that the structures and organization choices 
of databases “diffuse into the information system” and users no longer pay attention to the “langue” of 
the database); GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 323 (1999) (referring to databases’ structures and observing that for the user, 
the databases' structure often becomes “invisible”). 
70. See Judith Shulevitz, Alexa, Should We Trust You?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), https://www.the 
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/alexa-how-will-you-change-us/570844/ [https://perma.cc/KQ9 
R-KYWY]. 
71. See Kari Paul, Microsoft Had to Suspend Its AI Chatbot After It Veered into White 
Supremacy, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 24, 2016, 11:21 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/arti 
cle/kb7zdw/microsoft-suspends-ai-chatbot-after-it-veers-into-white-supremacy-tay-and-you [https://pe 
rma.cc/7QAL-TZDH].  
72. Schwartz & Cook, supra note 68, at 1. 











future’s past may be controlled through algorithms that mediate the contents 
of those archives. In such a (possible, feasible) future where most of our 
collective memory is mediated through AI and robots, manipulation can 
easily distort the memories of our joint past.73  
The challenges we discuss above are salient, though certainly not 
exhaustive. Our analysis concentrates on the ‘user side,’ namely on the 
effect of AI-mediated technologies on users exposed to their output. Yet, AI 
mediation of collective memory raises additional ethical and legal 
questions, including questions pertaining to the relations between the AI 
creators and the ‘contributors’ of the underlying materials. When the 
database underlying the AI is created with the consent and active 
participation of those contributors, as was the case in the NDT project, these 
questions are not acute. Yet, they may arise if an AI based system uses pre-
existing archives of photos, videos, or documents. Consider, again, the 
imaginary ‘virtual Lincoln’ that derives from a database of Lincoln’s 
writings. A detailed discussion of this axis exceeds the scope of this 
Commentary, and certainly warrants future research.74 Yet, the policy 
framework we propose in the following Part sheds light on these types of 
questions too.  
What, then, is the appropriate policy response to the challenges that lie 
at the intersection of AI and collective memory? In the next Part, we 
introduce the concept of memory fiduciaries and argue that this conception 
allows us to devise an initial policy framework toward robotic collective 
memory. 
III. TOWARD A FRAMEWORK OF MEMORY FIDUCIARIES  
In a nutshell, we maintain that entities which employ robotic memory 
agents to mediate materials that affect our intergenerational memory should 
be considered ‘memory fiduciaries,’ and as such, should be subject to 
certain fiduciary duties. 
What are the justifications for memory fiduciaries in the age of robotic 
collective memory? Who should be considered a memory fiduciary, and 
what type of duties should apply to these entities with respect to collective 
memory that is mediated by AI? The following Section presents the notion 
of memory fiduciaries and its justifications, while analyzing the parallels 
and differences between this concept and Balkin’s information fiduciaries 
 
73. Cf. Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 157, 158 (2019) (discussing a risk of commercial manipulation entailed in digital environments).  
74. See, e,g,, Pessach & Shur-Ofry, supra note 30 (analyzing copyright questions that arise when 
remembrance institutions seek to use pre-existing Holocaust-related materials). Notably, copyright is 
not the sole legal branch that may be relevant in such cases. Questions pertaining to privacy, the right of 












framework. The next Section then proceeds to demonstrate the application 
of the memory fiduciaries framework to the use of algorithmic memory 
agents. Our discussion, however, is far from comprehensive. While we do 
offer some tentative answers, our main purpose is to introduce memory 
fiduciaries as a potential policy framework for thinking about the challenges 
that lie at the intersection of collective memory and new technologies, and 
open up an avenue for future discussions of these issues.  
A. From Information Fiduciaries to Memory Fiduciaries  
Our proposed concept of memory fiduciaries is analogous, though not 
identical, to the concept of information fiduciaries. The latter was recently 
advanced by Jack Balkin as a response to rising privacy concerns in the 
digital age.75 According to Balkin’s analysis, the extensive collection and 
use of personal data in the digital age gives rise to new fiduciary duties that 
apply to digital organizations, even in the absence of a contractual basis.76 
These duties are based, to a large extent, on the trust that these entities 
“induce” from people, “[b]y presenting themselves as trustworthy collectors 
and keepers of our individual data.”77 The trust-based relationship is 
typically accompanied by information asymmetries, whereby the precise 
data collected and the ways in which it is used are not fully transparent to 
the ordinary user.78 Therefore, entities collecting and using large amounts 
of personal data hold considerable power, which is only increasing as more 
and more decisions based on that data are made by algorithms.79 This state 
 
75. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 10. For additional scholarship proposing to base 
privacy in the digital age on trust and fiduciary relationship, see Jessica Litman, Information 
Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1308–09 (2000) (arguing that trust and fiduciary 
duties can serve as a basis for respecting privacy); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust 
Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. Rev. 431, 457–58 (2016) (arguing that “the concept of 
fiduciaries helpfully reorients privacy and crystalizes the concept of trust in information relationships”); 
ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 85–92 
(2018) (arguing that data collectors should be considered “information fiduciaries” due to the asymmetry 
and vulnerability that characterize their relationship with the users); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 103 (2004) (“[T]he law should hold 
that companies collecting and using our personal information stand in a fiduciary relationship with us.”). 
This literature includes significant insights concerning the interface of privacy and trust, yet since our 
focus here is on intergenerational memory (and not on privacy), a comprehensive review of these 
discussions exceeds the scope of this Commentary. 
76. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 10, at 1200–05, 1221 (discussing the limits of 
the contractual model in response to privacy concerns in the digital age and proposing to overcome them 
via the concept of fiduciary duties that would apply even absent a contractual obligation).  
77. Id. at 1223; see also Litman, supra note 75 (describing the trust-based relationship between 
entities that receive private information and the individuals that provide it); Richards & Hartzog, supra 
note 75 (promoting the concept of fiduciary duties, based on trust relationship, in engagements that 
involve the provision of personal information). 
78. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 10, at 1222–23. 
79. Id. at 1185–86, 1232 (“As algorithms for making decisions based on this data become more 
powerful, so too will the people and organizations who collect and use the data.”). 











of affairs creates a reasonable expectation that the digital organizations 
collecting our data “will not betray us.”80 Rather, these entities have a duty 
to act in a trustworthy manner that is consistent with ethical standards and 
protect the trust we place in their hands.81 
While Balkin’s analysis concentrates on privacy concerns ensuing from 
the collection of individual data by private stakeholders, significant parallels 
can be drawn to the case of algorithmic collective memory. Most 
prominently, our relationship with the entities that mediate collective 
memory through algorithmic agents are also based on trust and confidence. 
We trust these entities that the materials they mediate through algorithmic 
agents are authentic materials, and that the deployment of such agents aims 
to recollect the past without external third-party interventions. To illustrate, 
let us briefly return to Pinchas Gutter and the NDT system. Witnesses like 
Gutter who contribute their testimonies as input for robotic memory agents 
trust that these testimonies will not be misrepresented but rather be used in 
a trustworthy manner. However, the trust relationship in this and similar 
cases is broader; it also extends to the side of the ‘users.’ Those exposed to 
robotic memory agents similarly trust that the output the virtual witnesses 
generate constitutes as accurate a representation as possible of the original 
testimonies.  
Two important factors enhance trust in our case. The first is the human 
tendency to anthropomorphize. As the previous discussion indicates, when 
the past is conveyed through interactive social robots, which appear human 
and animated, feelings of empathy and trust are almost inevitable.82 The 
second factor is more general and concerns our inclination to trust the 
entities that are active in the field of collective memory. Remembrance 
institutions, such as archives, libraries, museums, or memorials, collect and 
mediate to us much of the information that comprises collective memory.83 
These institutions are often not-for-profit entities that regard the collection 
and the provision of access to materials for purposes of intergenerational 
memory as their primary mission.84  
 
80. Id. at 1222 (“[Online service providers] present themselves to the public as responsible and 
upstanding organizations who will use their power for lawful ends and, above all, who will not betray 
us.”). 
81. Id. at 1205–07, 1224–25. For a recent proposal of imposing specific duties on service 
providers who collect data on their users, see also Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: 
Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2018). 
82. See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
83. See the discussion of remembrance institutions, supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.  
84. See, for example, the mission statement of the “American Memory” collection that forms 
part of the Library of Congress. Mission and History, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://memory.loc.gov/amm 
em/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/LR82-5EGE] (“American Memory provides free and open 
access through the Internet to written and spoken words, sound recordings, still and moving images, 
prints, maps, and sheet music that document the American experience. It is a digital record of American 












This is not to say that business entities cannot be significant players in 
the field of collective memory. In fact, as technology develops, the impact 
of private technology companies on collective memory is bound to 
increase.85 The Google Cultural Institute is a case in point: the Institute 
collaborates with more than a thousand museums and cultural institutions 
and, among other activities, presents digital exhibitions on topics central to 
collective memory, from the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Apartheid.86 
However, even when market players are involved, these ventures are still 
perceived by the users, and often described by the providers, as public-
oriented.87 In other words, we have a social expectation that those who play 
in the field of collective memory adopt a public-oriented approach, and we 
may be more inclined to trust them ex ante in their activities in this area.88  
Notably, a recent criticism of Balkin’s information fiduciaries 
framework maintains that there could be a potential conflict between the 
market-oriented focus of technology companies and their duties toward 
their shareholders, and the proposed fiduciary scheme.89 However, the long-
term intergenerational nature of collective memory, and the public-oriented 
traits of its mediation, distinguish memory fiduciaries from technology 
platforms, and imply that those possible conflicts do not arise in an acute 
form in the present case. In other words, in the field of collective memory, 
 
institutions, chronicle historical events, people, places, and ideas that continue to shape America, serving 
the public as a resource for education and lifelong learning.”); see also The History of the Shoah 
Memorial, MÉMORIAL DE LA SHOAH, http://www.memorialdelashoah.org/en/the-memorial/presentation 
/the-history-of-the-shoah-memorial.html [https://perma.cc/M5K2-3SXW] (“Today the Memorial, a 
museum and archival center, is a place of mediation essential for the transmission of memory.”).  
85. Pessach, supra note 30, at 85 (arguing that the digital age brings with it increased 
privatization of memory institutions). 
86. See GOOGLE CULTURAL INST., https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/about/partners/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/7YBC-C6BT].  
87. See id. (“Founded in 2011, the Google Cultural Institute is a not-for-profit initiative that 
partners with cultural organizations to bring the world’s cultural heritage online.”); see also Google 
Books Library Project: An Enhanced Card Catalog of the World’s Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://www. 
google.com/googlebooks/library/ [https://perma.cc/9DTK-ZRVL] (“The Library Project's aim is 
simple: make it easier for people to find relevant books – specifically, books they wouldn't find any 
other way such as those that are out of print – while carefully respecting authors' and publishers' 
copyrights.”).   
88. Cf. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN 
CULTURAL TREASURES (1999) [hereinafter SAX, PLAYING DARTS] (proposing that the administration of 
“cultural treasures” must consider the public interest, even when these treasures are placed in private 
hands); WHOSE MUSE? ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST (James Cuno ed., 2004) [hereinafter 
WHOSE MUSE?] (suggesting that museums must adopt a public-oriented approach); Guy Pessach, The 
Role of Libraries in A2K: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 257 (making similar 
observations with respect to libraries).  
89. Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341661. A thorough analysis of this argument 
is unnecessary in the present context, and exceeds the scope of this Commentary. 











users’ trust is a most salient feature, which further reinforces the adequacy 
of the memory fiduciaries framework.90  
Moreover, power relations and information asymmetries that constitute 
important tenets in Balkin’s concept of information fiduciaries prevail in 
our case too.91  Whether public or private, remembrance institutions 
inevitably exercise discretion regarding which information to collect, 
record, preserve, digitize, and display, or conversely, leave out or 
marginalize. From the recipients’ perspective, these decisions are often 
invisible and seldom questioned.92 Yet, remembrance institutions “wield 
power over the shape and direction of . . . collective memory, and national 
identity, over how we know ourselves as individuals, groups, and 
societies.”93  
The unequal power relations and information asymmetries are likely to 
expand in the age of algorithms. One of the pillars of effective AI systems 
is the availability of large databases of relevant information.94 In the case of 
collective memory, the relevant materials—documents, videos, or photos—
are regularly held by remembrance institutions.95 Ordinarily, individuals 
would not have the ability to access these raw materials in their entirety, nor 
the capacity to process them through AI-based technologies. Remembrance 
institutions may therefore be in the best position to develop algorithmic 
memory agents, possibly in cooperation with technology companies.  
To a large extent, then, one can expect that those who “control the 
archives” will also control the algorithms that mediate their contents to the 
public. It is entirely plausible that the algorithms themselves will not be 
publicly shared. Even in cases like the NDT project, whose creators 
demonstrate considerable openness regarding the design principles 
underlying the virtual witnesses system, some parts of the system—for 
example the natural language processing software or the stock of underlying 
answers—are, to the best of our knowledge, not open to the public. And 
even if they were, it is unrealistic that ordinary members of the public would 
possess the capacity or will to scrutinize them.96  
 
90. Cf. id. (manuscript at 33) (arguing that the salient feature of companies like Google and 
Facebook is “not that their end users must be able to trust and depend on them”). 
91. For the discussion of these factors under the information fiduciaries framework, see supra 
notes 77–80 and accompanying text.  
92. See supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text; Schwartz & Cook, supra note 68, at 3. 
93. Schwartz & Cook, supra note 68, at 2. 
94. Cf. Press Release, European Comm’n, Artificial Intelligence: Commission Outlines a 
European Approach to Boost Investment and Set Ethical Guidelines (Apr. 25, 2018), http://europa.eu/rap 
id/press-release_IP-18-3362_en.htm [https://perma.cc/5SJ8-M926] (“[D]ata is the raw material for most 
AI technologies . . . .”).  
95. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text; cf. Pessach & Shur-Ofry, supra note 30, at 
136, 168–69 (explaining that market stakeholders would seldom be interested in such materials). 
96. This phenomenon is of course not unique to robotic memory agents. Similar asymmetries 












Beyond those common features of trust, power relations, and 
asymmetries, collective memory and information share two fundamental 
traits that further justify our proposal. First, similar to information, 
collective memory is a public good, with qualities of non-rivalry and non-
excludability that make it vulnerable to misuse and manipulation.97 As the 
preceding analysis instructs, these fears are intensified in the age of robotic 
collective memory.98 Therefore, classical public-goods theory reinforces the 
need for policy interventions designed to prevent such misuse.99 Secondly, 
our discussion of collective memory illuminates its substantial social value 
and its importance for the formation of social and individual identities.100 In 
light of these traits, collective memory forms a vital part of cultural 
democracy. Just as the participation in contemporary discourse is essential 
for shaping people’s identities, worldviews, and beliefs, so is the 
participation in the intergenerational discourse. To use the renowned words 
of Jacques Derrida, “[t]here is no political power without control of the 
archive, if not of memory."101  
Balkin’s submission that “[p]eople have a right to participate in forms of 
power that reshape and alter them because what is literally at stake is their 
own selves,”102 is equally convincing with respect to collective memory, 
particularly when it is mediated through AI and algorithms. These insights 
imply that users’ participation in the collective-memory discourse is 
protected by their freedom of expression, and provide further justification 
for imposing certain duties on the entities that possess the power to mediate 
 
BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015) (discussing the asymmetries between the ample data which corporations 
collect on users while employing powerful algorithms, and the obscurity regarding the use of that data 
by the corporations themselves); Balkin, Three Laws, supra note 52, at 1227 (arguing that the use of 
algorithms should be subject to obligations of transparency, due process, and accountability); Joshua A. 
Kroll et. al, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017) (introducing computer science 
concepts that can be used to set out and verify algorithmic compliance with standards of legal fairness 
for automated decisions); Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms 
and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3–4 (2017) (discussing various concerns that arise due to the 
“black box” nature of algorithmic decisions). 
97. Cf. Pessach, supra note 30, at 116 (“[M]emory institutions and their subject matters are 
regarded by many as public goods . . . .”); Richard S. Whitt, “Through a Glass, Darkly”: Technical, 
Policy, and Financial Actions to Avert the Coming Digital Dark Ages, 33 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 117, 178–79 (2016) (identifying cultural preservation as a public good). For a general 
discussion of the nature of public goods, including their non-rivalrous and non-excludable qualities, see, 
for example, RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, 
AND CLUB GOODS 3–4 (1986); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL 
PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 308, 308–10 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle 
Grunberg & Marc A. Stern eds., 1999).  
98. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
99. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 97, at 311 (explaining that the protection and provision of public 
goods require certain state intervention). 
100. For the social value of collective memory, see supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
101. JACQUES DERRIDA, ARCHIVE FEVER: A FREUDIAN IMPRESSION 4 n.1 (Eric Prenowitz trans., 
1996). 
102. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 10, at 1211. 











collective memory, under the memory fiduciaries framework we advocate 
here.103 They also provide the answer to First Amendment concerns that 
were raised in the context of information fiduciaries, and clarify that placing 
reasonable duties on remembrance institutions in order to ensure people’s 
rights to participate in the construction of collective memory does not 
contradict the rights of those institutions under the First Amendment.104  
Altogether, the foregoing analysis indicates that there are solid 
justifications for extending the information-fiduciaries approach to the 
realm of collective memory, and specifically to the use of algorithmic 
memory agents. We therefore propose to recognize that certain fiduciary 
duties apply to the collection, provision, and mediation of materials that 
affect our intergenerational memory, through algorithmic memory agents. 
We refer to the entities that are subject to these duties as “memory 
fiduciaries.”  
Before we proceed to discuss the nature of memory fiduciaries and 
describe their duties in the case of algorithmic collective memory, a 
clarification is in order. Despite the substantial parallels, the concept of 
information fiduciaries is not completely identical to memory fiduciaries. 
As explained, Balkin’s framework was developed against a reality of 
powerful digital organizations—Facebook, Uber, or Google, to name some 
of his examples—that collect and control individuals’ data. The 
beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties under his theory are therefore the 
individuals whose information is being collected and processed.105 In the 
case of memory fiduciaries, the picture is more complex. Remembrance 
institutions that collect information and materials, which then become 
building blocks in the construction of collective memory, certainly owe 
fiduciary duties to individuals, like Pinchas Gutter, who contribute these 
materials. Yet, under our proposed framework, their duties extend beyond 
the contributors, and apply, in addition, to the recipients of their output—in 
our example, to users exposed to the virtual Gutter testimony.  
Oft-times, the relationship between these recipients, or users, and the 
providers of the information will not be an explicit contractual relationship. 
Moreover, from the institutions’ perspective, these users are not necessarily 
identified individuals. Nevertheless, our analysis demonstrates that trust, 
 
103. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053 
(2016) (explaining that under a cultural-democracy theory, the rights of people to participate in the 
formation of culture and meaning-making processes are protected as part of freedom of expression). 
104. Cf. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 10, at 1225 (“[R]easonable obligations 
placed on information fiduciaries do not violate the First Amendment . . . .”); Pasquale & Cockfield, 
supra note 7, at 864–66 (noting that “bot-mediated communication is an entirely distinct phenomenon 
from previous modes of communication” and warning against privileging algorithmic data-processing 
as speech).  












power, and asymmetries certainly characterize the relationship between 
those who mediate collective memory and the recipients of their outputs. 
Furthermore, due to the technological traits of algorithmic memory agents, 
this relationship is particularly vulnerable. Therefore, while the concept of 
memory fiduciaries may require a certain extension of extant doctrine, we 
believe this extension is well justified, and that the doctrine of fiduciary 
duties can and should be developed to accommodate memory fiduciaries.106  
We certainly acknowledge that the fiduciary framework we explore here 
is not the sole legal construct that can apply to the field of collective 
memory. Additional legal doctrines, such as public trust, can be useful in 
some cases, especially when the relevant entities are public entities and their 
activities affect the public at large.107 Yet, given the attributes of the 
relationship we describe in the foregoing paragraphs, the diverse nature of 
the entities that may employ algorithmic memory agents, and the inherent 
flexibilities of the fiduciary doctrine itself, we believe this doctrine provides 
a natural starting point for devising an appropriate governance framework 
for robotic collective memory. Our approach, which relies on the common-
law concept of fiduciary, is also consistent with recent scholarly approaches 
that illuminate the advantages of flexible common-law frameworks for 
regulating challenges pertaining to AI and robots.108  
The next Section proceeds to explore the duties that apply to memory 
fiduciaries in relation to robotic collective memory, while highlighting a 
series of related questions.  
 
106. For the flexibility of the doctrine, see, for example, Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, Essay, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1299 (2011) (acknowledging that fiduciary law can 
be a useful model in various contexts); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 9 (2011) (explaining that the 
degree of entrusted power determines whether a fiduciary relationship exists and how strict the duties 
should be); Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 10, at 1223 (“[A] changing society generates 
new kinds of fiduciary relations and fiduciary obligations that the law can and should recognize.”). 
107. For the classical doctrine of ‘public trust,’ see, generally, Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) 
(explaining that under the principle of public trust, the State acts as a trustee for the public with respect 
to certain common resources, such as the seashore, highways, and running water). For proposals to apply 
the public trust principles to the cultural sphere, see, for example, SAX, PLAYING DARTS, supra note 88 
(discussing the social responsibilities of museums and their long-standing function as public trusts); cf. 
John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, The Public Interest, and Protecting Our Cultural 
Inheritance, 55 RUTGERS L. REV 477, 541–44 (2003) (discussing the case of the Barnes collection and 
the justifications to impose responsibilities and obligations on museums, e.g. regarding the public’s 
access to their collections, based on their public functions). A full exploration of the applicability of 
these, and additional legal doctrines, to our case warrants further research and exceeds the scope of the 
present discussion.  
108. See Lemley & Casey, supra note 51 (manuscript at 6) (“[A] common law, case-by-case 
approach may provide a promising means of successfully navigating the definitional issues presented by 
robots—one that builds and adapts its definitions inductively over time rather than trying to legislate 
it.”). 











B. Memory Fiduciaries in the Age of AI 
Preliminary clarifications are in order regarding the contours of our 
discussion and its location in the broader landscape. This Commentary 
focuses on the intersection of collective memory and AI. The analysis in the 
previous Parts instructs that this interface raises new and pressing 
challenges, which make the fiduciary framework particularly apt. The 
following paragraphs apply our proposed framework to memory fiduciaries 
that mediate the past through algorithmic memory agents, and sketch, in 
broad strokes, their fiduciary duties. However, the memory-fiduciaries 
framework could possibly have more general implications for collective 
memory, beyond its interface with robots, AI, or other cutting-edge 
technologies. The nature of collective memory as a public good that is 
susceptible to vulnerabilities, and as an essential part of cultural democracy, 
implies that this conceptualization may be useful in analyzing broader 
questions pertaining to collective memory construction through more 
traditional means. In other words, the memory fiduciary concept can 
possibly inform the analysis of diverse questions related to intergenerational 
collective memory, from access to historical materials through preservation 
of physical “memory sites,” to the display of historically significant 
artifacts. However, exploring the potential of the memory-fiduciaries 
framework to address such broader issues exceeds the scope of this 
Commentary. We leave it for future work.  
We should also clarify that the memory-fiduciaries framework is not 
confined to public or quasi-public remembrance institutions. Of course, 
remembrance institutions, such as museums, archives, and libraries, with 
substantial activities of documenting, preserving, and providing access to 
various materials should be subject to this framework. However, the 
increasing involvement of private business players and technology 
companies in the field of memory construction prescribes that these entities, 
too, could be regarded as memory fiduciaries with regard to some of their 
activities—consider, again, the example of the Google Cultural Institute.109 
It is reasonable to assume that these entities may already view themselves 
as subject to some sort of duties in their activities in the field of collective 
memory, even if they do not use the term fiduciary to describe them.110 
Indeed, border cases may arise, and line-drawing would be inevitable under 
our framework, as it is under any other legal construct. Yet, as a general 
 
109. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
110. See the discussion of the public-regarding approach that remembrance institutions often 
adopt, supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text; cf. Sundar Pichai, AI at Google: Our Principles, 
GOOGLE (June 7, 2018), https://www.blog.google/technology/ai/ai-principles/ [https://perma.cc/CG8G-
QABW] (Google’s AI principles include, inter alia, principles relating to security and accountability, 












guideline, the application of the memory fiduciaries framework would not 
depend on the public or private nature of the entity, but on the activities of 
that entity in the field of collective memory and the attributes of its 
relationships with both contributors and end-users.111  
Which duties, then, should apply to memory fiduciaries that mediate 
collective memory through algorithmic agents? The notion of fiduciary 
generally consists of two main obligations: a duty of loyalty—also described 
as “trustworthiness” or a duty “not to betray”—and a duty of care, or “a duty 
not to harm.”112 The concrete contents of these duties depend on the precise 
circumstances. The circumstances in the case of deploying robotic agents 
for mediating collective memory illuminate two principal challenges: the 
subsistence of unavoidable editorial choices that are invisible to the end-
users, and the susceptibility of the technology to misuse, hacking, or 
manipulation by third parties.113 The design of memory fiduciary duties 
should therefore correspond to these challenges.  
Concomitantly, we must also take into account the benefits entailed in 
the use of algorithmic memory agents, and shape fiduciary duties in a way 
that will not jeopardize their deployment.114 Bearing in mind these general 
contours, we suggest four prominent, though not exhaustive, duties that 
apply in the case of robotic collective memory: 1) ‘Identify the Robot’; 2) 
Explainability; 3) Reasonable Data Security; and 4) Integrity.115  
Under the first principle, entities that mediate collective memory through 
AI should be under an obligation to inform end-users exposed to the outputs 
that AI is involved.116 The teenagers who interact with the virtual Gutter in 
a classroom surely understand that they are sitting in front of a screen. Yet, 
 
111. Cf. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 10, at 1186–87 (suggesting that the duties of 
digital organizations collecting information about users should derive from the nature of the 
relationship). Notably, this Commentary does not purport to strictly draw the definitive borders of 
memory fiduciaries. Hopefully, future work will further develop the distinctions we propose here. 
However, as we explain below, the common-law nature and case-sensitivity of the fiduciary doctrine 
will allow us to resolve border-line cases as they arise. 
112. FRANKEL, supra note 106, at 106–07, 169 (further suggesting that the duty of care is weaker 
than the duty of loyalty); see also Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 10, at 1222 (describing 
information fiduciaries’ duty “not to betray”). 
113. See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text. 
114. For a discussion of the benefits, see supra notes 53–60 and accompanying text.  
115. Notably, we do not argue that the interface of AI and memory necessarily requires devising 
unique solutions de novo, and indeed some of the principles we propose here are derived from the vast 
literature that investigated other challenges posed by AI and robots and offered a broad menu of 
regulatory responses. See, e.g., Universal Guidelines for Artificial Intelligence, PUB. VOICE (Oct. 23, 
2018), https://thepublicvoice.org/ai-universal-guidelines [https://perma.cc/B3JY-MDRV]. Rather, our 
aim is to sketch the contents of the proposed fiduciary duty, by highlighting specific principles that 
correspond to the particular challenges that lie at the intersection of AI, robots, and collective memory.  
116. See Tim Wu, Please Prove You’re Not a Robot, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2017), https://www.nyti 
mes.com/2017/07/15/opinion/sunday/please-prove-youre-not-a-robot.html [https://perma.cc/ZFT3-SZ 
KW] (proposing a “Blade Runner” law that prohibits the use of “any program that hides its real identity 
to pose as a human”). 











those watching a video documentation of the interaction may not be so 
certain as to the virtual nature of the witness.117 And as visualization 
technologies develop, our ability to distinguish between the real and the 
virtual will likely further diminish.118 Notably, AI employed in mediating 
collective memory may not always have a visual interface—imagine, for 
example, a conversation with the ‘ultimate witness’ of the Vietnam War, an 
AI, voice-based, interactive system that answers questions about the War, 
using an integrated database of hundreds of testimonies. In such cases, it 
may be nearly impossible to identify the robotic nature of the system absent 
an explicit notification.119  
In broader terms, the more algorithmic collective memory becomes 
ubiquitous and widely distributed through myriad digital channels, the 
greater the need is to alert users of its robotic nature. We should perhaps 
clarify that the principle of ‘identify the robot’ is not equivalent to ‘define 
the robot.’ Literature instructs that such definition may be difficult, at times 
even impossible, and it is not required for our purposes.120 Rather, our 
emphasis is essentially on the need to exercise transparency when collective 
memory is mediated through AI-based technologies. 
Under the second, related principle, a duty of explainability should apply 
to entities using AI to mediate collective memory. The notion of 
‘explainability,’ derived from administrative law, has recently penetrated 
the field of AI. According to Frank Pasquale, explainability in this context 
suggests the provision of “a clear sense of the history of a robot—how was 
it first programmed, to what has it been exposed, and how has this interplay 
between hardware, software, and the external environment resulted in 
present behavior.”121 In our case, explainability similarly implies a duty of 
entities that use algorithmic memory agents to provide information about 
the system’s general design principles. For example, what is the database of 
raw materials that were used to create the system, and what is the 
relationship between the underlying materials and the output generated by 
the virtual memory agent? We do not propose, however, that explainability 
includes a general duty to provide the code underlying the system. Such an 
obligation would, in most cases, be cumbersome for the memory fiduciary 
 
117. Consider the video of the discussion quoted in the Introduction supra note 1.  
118. See the examples supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.  
119. Consider Google’s Duplex technology supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
120. For the definitional challenges, see Lemley & Casey, supra note 51, and the literature cited 
supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
121. See Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, 












and have little value for the end user.122 Rather, it should focus on explaining 
the principles underlying the design.  
To illustrate how explainability might work in the field of algorithmic 
collective memory, the NDT project is again a case in point. The USC Shoah 
Foundation released information that describes how the database of 
questions and answers underlying the virtual agents was created, including 
the general number of questions the survivors were asked, as well as the 
location, setting, and duration of the filming.123 It clarified that the interface 
of the system and the end-user is controlled by a natural language processing 
software. It further explained the relations between the answers of the 
virtual survivors and the underlying database. According to the information 
provided, the system draws the virtual survivor’s answers from the database 
of original answers that the survivor provided, and plays back these answers 
verbatim to the end user.124  
Future developments may complicate the picture and further reinforce 
the need for explanation. As the technology of algorithmic memory agents 
becomes prevalent, it is far from certain that other remembrance institutions 
will adopt NDT’s expansive approach towards information provision. In 
addition, with the rapid technological advancement of AI, the use of 
algorithmic memory agents could develop in additional directions. For 
example, researchers anticipate a significant qualitative improvement in the 
ability of machines to ‘understand’ information rather than just index it. The 
expectation is that in future years, AI that is able to synthesize information, 
‘connect the dots,’ and generate evaluations and knowledge about the world 
will become an integral part of various social activities.125 Consider, then, a 
virtual memory agent whose output does not merely consist of an accurate, 
verbatim representation of underlying materials, but who can “fill in” gaps 
in those materials, and generate new answers that are based on synthesizing, 
summarizing, and “understanding” them.  
To illustrate, let us return to the hypothetical ‘ultimate witness,’ a voice-
based AI system that delivers an integrated testimony about the Vietnam 
War based on myriad recorded and written testimonies.126 Imagine, that in 
 
122. Cf. Kroll et al., supra note 96, at 639 (noting that full transparency and exposure of software 
code “may still fail to resolve the concerns of many participants”). 
123. See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text. 
124. Id.  
125. See, e.g., Stuart Russell, Q&A: The Future of Artificial Intelligence, http://people.eecs.berkel 
ey.edu/~russell/temp/q-and-a.html [https://perma.cc/KR6Z-4XVC] (“[A]s machines improve their 
grasp of language, search engines and ‘personal assistants’ on mobile phones will change 
from indexing web pages to understanding web pages, leading to qualitative improvements in their 
ability to answer questions, synthesize new information, offer advice, and connect the dots. . . . [S]ystems 
that know and reason about the real world, not just repositories of data—will become integral parts of 
society.”). 
126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 











answering users’ questions the virtual witness does not merely quote the 
relevant passages from existing testimonies, but rather synthesizes the 
sources to phrase new, more comprehensive answers, and even to raise 
hypotheses that fill in gaps in the raw materials. Obviously, in such cases 
the element of editorial discretion would be much more significant in 
comparison to the virtual Gutter, and the discrepancy between the raw 
materials and the output substantially larger. As a minimum, the duty of 
explainability would mandate the disclosure of the design principles 
underlying such virtual agents, including the existence of a machine-
learning element that affects its output. More broadly, this example 
demonstrates that the exact contents and breadth of the explainability duty, 
and of memory fiduciaries’ duties more generally, could vary under 
different circumstances. While we cannot sketch here every potential 
scenario, as a general matter, where the perceived authenticity of the 
memory-mediation is greater these duties should be heavier.  
A duty of explainability may also nudge remembrance institutions 
contemplating the introduction of algorithmic memory agents to engage in 
critical self-evaluation of the technologies they wish to employ and the 
entailed risks and benefits, without interfering with their editorial discretion. 
As such, explainability could create a de facto standard of conduct and serve 
not only as a governing principle but also as a normative source for 
remembrance institutions deliberating the increasingly difficult dilemma at 
the interface of AI and collective memory. 
From the users’ perspective, recognizing a duty to ‘identify the robot’ 
together with a duty of explainability will raise users’ awareness that their 
interactions entail a mediated representation of the original testimony or 
other raw materials, protect them from mistakenly assuming that they are 
interacting with a human, and shield them from feeling betrayed.127 It will 
also direct a spotlight to the otherwise invisible layers of editorial choices 
embedded in the deployment of algorithmic agents, and allow users to 
‘calibrate’ their judgement and understanding accordingly. Clarifying that 
memory is mediated through AI is therefore consistent with the principles 
of loyalty and care that constitute the core of fiduciary duties. 
Concomitantly, research instructs that the tendency to anthropomorphize 
social robots does not disappear when people are aware that they are 
interacting with a robot, even when they understand the robot’s underlying 
mechanism.128 Therefore, abiding by these principles will not jeopardize the 
 
127. Cf. Sherry Turkle, Authenticity in the Age of Digital Companions, in MACHINE ETHICS 62 
(Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh Anderson eds., 2011) (arguing that authenticity and the difference 
between social robots and sentient creatures are still, and should be, important to people).  
128. See supra note 56 and accompanying text, which indicates that anthropomorphism subsists 












users’ experience of personal interaction, nor undermine feelings of 
empathy.  
Our preceding analysis further instructs that algorithmic memory agents 
are vulnerable to risks of hacking, or third-party manipulation that can harm 
the integrity of the mediated content. Therefore, under our proposed third 
principle, memory fiduciaries should introduce reasonable data security 
measures to prevent those risks.129 To illustrate, let us return once more to 
the virtual Pinchas Gutter. When confronted by a reporter with a direct 
question concerning Holocaust denial, the virtual Gutter answered: “To 
someone who has spent five years in hell—a living witness—[people who 
say] that this did not happen . . . I believe that they are just as bad as the 
perpetrators . . . . Every one of them should be taken to a court of law 
because they are in contempt of humanity itself.”130 It is easy to hypothesize 
how a hacked version of the system could provide a very different answer, 
which in turn could have a distorting effect on collective memory. Put 
differently, the use of algorithmic memory agents creates an enhanced risk 
of manipulation, and memory fiduciaries who decide to employ these agents 
are under a duty to adopt protection measures to internalize this risk. This 
duty, too, is consistent with principles of harm prevention and loyalty, not 
only toward the end-users but also to contributors like Gutter, who trust 
memory fiduciaries to preserve the integrity of their testimonies.  
This last example leads us to a related, fourth principle, which we call 
integrity. It could be insufficient to identify the robot, explain the principles 
underlying the system, and maintain its data security, if the mediated 
contents are intentionally distorted—to illustrate, consider a hypothetical 
example of a museum that uses virtual witnesses to promote a Holocaust-
denial narrative. The principle of integrity implies that when memory 
fiduciaries mediate collective memory through robots and AI, they need to 
apply these automation processes in a way that conforms with standards of 
accuracy and aspires to be consistent with historical facts.  
Indeed, as our preceding discussion instructs, collective memory, by its 
nature, lends itself to a multiplicity of voices and does not, in fact cannot, 
constitute an objective historical account. Rather, each process of mediating 
 
129. For somewhat similar proposals in the context of access to personal data, see, for example, 
Pasquale & Cockfield, supra note 7, at 863 (discussing the duty to introduce legal protection against 
“outside hackers and others who are interested in illegal or improper access to personal data”); see also 
Universal Guidelines for Artificial Intelligence, supra note 115 (“Institutions must secure AI systems 
against cybersecurity threats.”). 
130. See Emanuel Maiberg, In the Future, the Holocaust Is Just Another Hologram, VICE: 
MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 25, 2017, 9:44 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ez3m4p/in-the-future-t 
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original) (the quote refers to the answer given by the virtual witness in response to the reporter’s 
provocative question: “I don't believe the gas chambers existed”).  











collective memory inevitably involves editorial choices and subjective 
discretion.131 Nevertheless, while memory fiduciaries certainly face a broad 
continuum of legitimate editorial choices, they are under a duty not to distort 
the mediated materials, nor to knowingly deviate from accepted historical 
truths. Clearly, the principle of integrity is not limited to collective memory 
mediated by robots, and applies to remembrance institutions that mediate 
collective memory through more traditional media as well. However, as our 
discussion above demonstrates, the reliance of users on the robotic outputs 
is especially pronounced, and therefore the corresponding duty of integrity 
is particularly significant in this context. 
Taken together, the four principles we explored will allow maintaining 
the benefits of robotic memory agents while minimizing the costs involved. 
These principles, however, are not exhaustive. We do not purport to address 
all possible scenarios that may arise as algorithmic memory agents become 
widespread, nor do we argue that the fiduciary framework provides a 
magical solution to all the challenges pertaining to AI and collective 
memory. Our aim is to illustrate how the memory fiduciaries notion 
provides a helpful framework for thinking about some of these challenges 
and can be applied to handle them. The inherent flexibility of the fiduciary 
doctrine and its sensitivity to context would allow courts and scholars to 
develop it on a case-by-case basis, to accommodate additional duties, or 
reshape these duties to address the myriad additional questions that are 
bound to arise at the intersection of AI and collective memory.  
CONCLUSION 
It is by now conventional wisdom that AI will deeply affect our future. 
This Commentary suggests that its impact on our collective past may be no 
less significant. Our analysis demonstrates that the intersection of AI, 
robots, and collective memory carries enormous potential, alongside 
substantial challenges. These challenges have been largely overlooked by 
the law and policy discussions of AI, social robots, and robot-human 
interface. Nevertheless, they deserve consideration by policy makers.  
Our analysis further indicates that confronting these challenges and 
designing appropriate policies for the era of algorithmic collective memory 
must derive from, and connect, two disparate strands of knowledge. On the 
one hand, it warrants a close and detailed look at the technologies 
underlying robotic memory agents. On the other hand, it requires an 
exploration of collective memory, its traits and significance for the 
formation of social and individual identities.  
 












This Commentary has taken the first steps in combining these strands, 
and introduced the concept of memory fiduciaries as a policy framework for 
addressing robotic collective memory. Hopefully, future work will further 
develop and calibrate this framework. More broadly, collective memory and 
new technologies form a curious site of intersection of past and future. The 
legal regulation of this site deserves further exploration. This Commentary, 
we hope, will spark a conversation in this direction. 
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